
The encryption algorithms being developed to be safer from attack by quantum computers are already coming under fire from security researchers.
A new paper from PSL University in France developed a method that reduces the complexity of breaking lattices used in the latest post quantum algorithms. The mathematical properties that enhance the efficiency of cryptosystems can also make them vulnerable to more targeted attacks.
The NTRU (N-th degree Truncated polynomial Ring Units) lattice was developed by an international group of researchers form Qualcomm and the Eindhoven University of Technology for the Falcon post quantum algorithms to be chosen by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the US.
Researchers Henry Bambury and Phong Nguyen at PSL showed that the time to break the NTRU lattices used in Falcon and most concrete instances of the NTRU cryptosystem can be reduced significantly.
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This follows a recent Beijing University paper on potentially cracking Lattice-based post-quantum algorithms (PQAs) and many companies, including Microsoft, edging closer towards a Universal Quantum Computer.
“The pace of attacks on post-quantum algorithms (PQA) is relentless. It is now unrealistic for anyone to confidently predict that quantum computers won’t break PQAs within 3-5 years. They might, or they might not – but, betting the farm on a hunch that human progress will stall isn’t a rational way to protect critical data assets,” said David Williams, CEO at Arqit, which is developing a quantum-safe end-to-end framework.
“Nguyen is highly regarded in lattice analysis, known for his success in defeating proposed systems. This method, which seems mathematically strong at first glance, applies to some popular PQA proposals where the lattices have extra structure – including the often-overlooked FALCON,” said Williams.
“Despite FALCON’s victory in the NIST process, it lags behind KYBER and DILITHIUM in standardisation, but its lower bandwidth requirements might make it a good DILITHIUM alternative. The work shows how the ‘effective dimension’ of the problem could be roughly halved, which would roughly halve the bits of security. While the results lack specific estimates of the idea’s impact on security, they do highlight the importance of comparing it carefully with FALCON.
“As the White House and NSA have clearly stated, Symmetric Keys are the most sensible strategy for ensuring data security. This is the only ‘sleep at night’ answer.”
