Workgroup to tackle risks of GNSS spoofing
Data from researchers in Switzerland shows a significant spike in GPS Spoofing over the last few months, with an increasing risk to flight safety.
This has led to a workgroup being set up to address the increased risks of GNSS satellite navigation spoofing, where signals are blocked or changed.
The number of flights affected has risen from an average of 200 daily in the period January-March, to around 900 daily for the second quarter of 2024 according to Data from Zurich University of Applied Sciences & SkAI Data Services.
On some days, as many as 1350 flights have encountered spoofing. Flight crews also report that the intensity of the spoofing is increasing.
What is spoofing and how to ensure GPS security?
At the same time, the number of locations where spoofing is highly active has increased from three to more than ten. At the outbreak of the new spoofing phenomenon in September 2023, spoofing was encountered in northern Iraq (near Baghdad), Egypt (near Cairo), and Israel. Since then, the Black Sea, Cyprus, the Korean border, and Russia have become spoofing hotspots.
For flight crews, the workload and knock-on safety risk resulting from spoofing encounters is both changing and growing. Initially, the primary risk from a GPS spoof was navigational: autopilots began turning aircraft unexpectedly, aircraft position became uncertain, IRS was sometimes lost. With ATC help, often through radar vectors, the situation could be resolved.
With both the increase in intensity and frequency of spoofing this year, a second, more concerning set of risks is emerging.
The number of flights affected by spoofing, broken down by location. Data from Zurich University of Applied Sciences & SkAI Data Services.
GPS is interwoven into many, if not most, aircraft systems these days. The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) is suffering heavily, and is becoming unreliable. False alerts occurring hours after the spoofing event are now routine, and as a result, many are inhibiting the system.
There are other impacts. False EGPWS alerts are the primary culprit, but in some cases, the indicated wind on the Navigation Display is false and leads to confusion. In others, autopilot behaviour and unusual glideslope/localizer indications are causing missed approaches. Any go-around immediately increases crew workload and reduces the safety margin.
Other aircraft systems directly affected include TCAS, ADS-B, HUD guidance, and transponders. The aircraft clock, which crews are getting used to seeing “run backwards”, is often one of the first victims of a spoofing encounter, and has knock-on effects which include making CPDLC unusable. Eurocontrol report now seeing this on a daily basis.
A GPS Spoofing Workgroup has been established to bring the international civil aviation community together and address the problem. The Workgroup is now running to tackle the issue by collecting data and information, surveying flight crew, discussing the distinct elements of the problem, and producing a community report.
With the 14th ICAO Air Navigation Conference taking place at the end of August, the timing of the final report will aim to support discussions there.
450 participants have registered to take part in the Workgroup, which includes representatives of industry organizations IFALPA, IFATCA, OPSGROUP, IBAC, EBAA, ECA, and BALPA. Airlines and Operators represented include Aer Lingus, Air Atlanta, Alaska Airlines, Cathay, Cargolux, Singapore Airlines, Turkish Airlines, United Airlines, Netjets, El Al, Royal Jordanian, Italian Air Force, USAF, American Airlines, LOT Polish Airlines, and Fedex.
IT also includes PNT and GPS experts from NASA, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, FlightSafety International, Honeywell International, Safran Electronics & Defense, Satcom Direct, Aircraft Performance Group, Fokker Services, Honda Aircraft Company, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, and SkAI Data Services. Aviation Authorities participating include the Swedish CAA, Transport Canada Civil Aviation, Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand, CAA Isle of Man, Eurocontrol, FAA, and NATS UK.
The focus of the Workgroup will be to shift to discussing quickly available solutions such as the system being developed by Qualinkx, and broaden industry awareness of the growing safety risks. It will also seek to provide Flight Crews with better guidance, actions and GPS systems information.
Details of the Workgroup and how to register are here and applications to join are still open.
If you enjoyed this article, you will like the following ones: don't miss them by subscribing to :
